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COMMENTS
Countless Free-Standing Trees:
Non-Labor Boycotts After

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
The right of an individual or group of individualsto protest in
a peaceable manner against injustice or oppression, actual or
merely fancied, is one to be cherished and not to be proscribed
in any well-orderedsociety. It is an essential prerogativeoffree
men living under democratic institutions.And it is salutaryfor
the state, in that it serves as a safety valve in times of stress and
strain.'
INTRODUCTION

Boycotts have been used in the United States as a means of
protest since before the nation's founding. They played an important part in American response to the Stamp, Townshend and Intolerable Acts during the 1765-75 era.2 However, they fell from
favor in the more conservative nineteenth century' and were little used 4 until the Montgomery bus boycoto of 1955-56. Since
then, there has been a sharp upsurge in protest boycott activity.
Most of these boycotts have been directed against racial discrimination, but a number have been economic boycotts by consumers

directed at particular products.6
The term "boycott," as used in this Comment, describes a concerted refusal to deal in a product or with a business, coupled with
I Julie Baking

Co. v. Graymond, 274 N.Y.S. 250, 251-52 (Sup. Ct. 1934).

2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN

HISTORY, Nos. 40, 46, 54 (H. Commager ed. 1963).

3 L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 488-89 (1973).
4 As recently as 1953, a Note writer on the subject found only a few relevant cases
of non-labor boycotts. See Note, Tort Liability of Organizationsfor IntentionallyImpairing
Economic Relations, 28 IND. L. REv. 467 (1953).
5 For a brief account of the boycott, see H. SITKOFF, THE STRUCGLE FOR BLACK
EQUALITY, 1954-1980, at 41-58 (1981).
6 A short summary listing of 15 targets of consumer boycotts is in Missouri v. NOW,
620 F.2d 1301, 1304 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1981).
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efforts to induce third parties to likewise withhold their patronage.
This Comment deals only with non-labor boycotts. 7 The purpose
of these boycotts is to protest some condition and induce action
on the part of the targeted parties to correct the condition. The
condition protested against may be political, 8 social9 or economic"0 in nature. The racial boycotts which have been the most
common subjects of litigation generally combined protest against
an economic condition with a political protest against discrimination."

7 Although labor boycotts are similar to non-labor protest boycotts in the nature
of the actions involved, they are somewhat different in purpose and are governed by federal
labor law. Because they involve similar activities, especially picketing, some Supreme Court
labor decisions are relevant to the law regarding protest boycotts and are therefore referred to in this Comment.
8 A "political" boycott is one in which the primary goal of the protesters is to change
governmental policy or to secure the enactment of new laws. This term includes antidiscrimination boycotts which are not primarily directed at economic opportunities such
as jobs. One major distinction between "political" and "economic" boycotts is that the
political boycott is basically secondary, with its primary focus on forcing the boycott target
to use its influence to seek governmental change. Many boycotts have involved a political
element. For example, see Machesky v. Bizzel, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (involving
the "Greenwood Movement," a civil rights group); NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831
(5th Cir. 1966) (involving civil rights demonstrations); Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114 (5th
Cir. 1964) (same). Another type of political boycott is that found in Missouri v. NOW,
620 F.2d at 1301 (involving women's rights group seeking passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment).
9 Fewer cases arise from boycotts with social goals (excluding racial nondiscrimination boycotts), but see, e.g., Gresham Park Community Org. v. Howell, 652
F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981) (picketing of new liquor store in community); 1621, Inc. v.
Wilson, 166 A.2d 271 (Pa. 1961) (boycott of "excess" taproom in neighborhood); Watch
Tower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Dougherty, 11 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1940) (Catholic boycott against
radio station's religious criticism to be broadcast over airwaves). The grape and lettuce
boycotts in connection with union organizing in California were perhaps, at least in the
East, as much a social as a labor cause. One of several cases that arose from the latter
boycotts was Almac's, Inc. v. Rhode Island Grape Boycott Comm., 290 A.2d 52 (R.I. 1972).
10 The term "economic boycott" includes those protests whose primary goal is to advance the economic well-being of the protesters by inducing economic action on the part
of the target. See, e.g., Clemmons v. CORE, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La. 1962) (boycott
against hiring discrimination and segregation of facilities); In re Young, 211 N.Y.S.2d 621
(Sup. Ct. 1961) (boycott seeking orders for black liquor salesmen from stores in Harlem);
A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (boycott seeking employment of a certain percentage of blacks); Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 274 N.Y.S. at
250 (protest against high bread prices).
11 E.g., Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d at 283; NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F.2d at
831. A current example of a boycott having this dual character exists in Evanston, Illinois,
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Boycott organizers and participants face two fundamental legal
obstacles: 1) to be sustained, the boycott must withstand efforts
to enjoin supporting activities, such as picketing;12 and 2) even
if the boycott is successful, boycott organizers might be liable for

large damages from tort claims. 13 Both of these concerns are tied
to a common issue, the "legality" of the boycott. A finding of illegality may arise from three sources: 1) general tort principles
concerned with interference with prospective advantage;' 4 2)
state statutes regulating picketingS or attempting to limit interference with business activity; 16 or 3) antitrust legislation,
17
especially the Sherman Act.
Underlying the legality issue is the fact that these boycotts
create a conflict between the public interest in the goals espoused
and the property interest of those boycotted, a conflict compounded by the issue of first amendment rights claimed by protesters. Attempts by courts to balance these competing interests

in the numerous cases which have arisen 8 have led to somewhat

where Northwestern University students organized a boycott of merchants who refused
to display signs opposing a recent tax on Northwestern students passed by the Evanston
City Council. The Taxman Pounds on College Portals, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1982, at 94.
12 Most boycott cases concern injunctions. All of the cases in notes 8-9 supra, for
example, involved injunctions.
13 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982), rev'g 399
So. 2d 1290 (Miss. 1980); NAACP v. Overstreet, 142 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. 1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 118 (1966); Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. A.G. Corp.,
241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970); Sandifer & Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages: The New
Threat to Civil Rights Organization, 41 BRooKLYN L. REv. 559, 559-64 (1975).
14 See notes 23-30 infra and accompanying text.
15 One type of statute, making picketing itself illegal, was struck down in Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), and Kirkland v. Wallace, 403 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1968),
and would not be a source of illegality today, although laws which allow picketing but
regulate time, place and manner are valid.
16

E.g., Miss. CODE

ANN.

§ 97-23-85 (1972). This and related Mississippi statutes are

discussed in Madison, Mississippi'sSecondary Boycott Statute: UnconstitutionalDeprivation of the Right to Engage in Peaceful Picketing and Boycotting, 18 How. L.J. 583
(1975).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1981). See notes 48-54 infra and accompanying text.
18 See Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d at 114; NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179,
183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 376 U.S. 190 (1964); Green
v. Samuelson, 178 A. 109 (Md. 1935); A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 274 N.Y.S. at
946; Note, Political Boycott Activity and the FirstAmendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 659,
661 (1978).
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contradictory and unclear results. 9 Additionally, because these
fundamental public policy and constitutional interests have not
been clearly addressed by the United States Supreme Court, there
has been considerable uncertainty about whether and to what ex2°
tent protesters should be liable for the effects of their boycotts.
This Comment focuses on two of the three sources for finding
protest boycotts illegal-tort principles and antitrust statutes. It

then discusses the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
in NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo.,21 which dealt with these
grounds of illegality, as well as the conflict between public and
private interests and the threat to first amendment rights presented
by any finding of illegality in the boycott or liability of the
protesters.22 Finally, this Comment addresses the answers Claiborne provides and the questions it leaves unanswered for litigation concerning legality and liability in the context of political and
economic boycotts.
I.

A.

BOYCOTT LAw

BEFORE CLAIBORNE

Concerted Refusals to Deal

One of the sources for the idea that a concerted refusal to deal
can be illegal is the tort of intentional infliction of economic harm
without just or legal excuse. 23 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
19 Note, supra note 18, at 662. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 444 & n.49 (1970). The theories of liability are discussed at more length in
the text accompanying notes 23-54 infra.
20 T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 448. This uncertainty is reflected in the continuing series of law review material dealing with the topic, including Note, Legal Responsibility for Extra-Legal Censure, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 475 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Legal Responsibility];Note, supra note 18, at 659; Note, supra note 4, at 467; Comment,
The Common Law and ConstitutionalStatus of Anti-DiscriminationBoycotts, 66 YALE
L.J. 397 (1957).
21 102 S. Ct. at 3409.
22 For a discussion of various aspects of the first amendment connection to boycott
and picketing activity, see T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 435-49; Etelson, Picketing and
Freedom of Speech: Comes the Evolution, 10 J. PRAc. & Pnoc. 1 (1976); Note, supra note
18, at 659; Note, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe Way to Picket
Under the FirstAmendment?, 26 HASTImcs L.J. 167 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, The
Invisible Hand].
23 See NAACP v. Overstreet, 142 S,E.2d at 823; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE L w
OF TORTS § 130 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of boycott illegality, see Comment, supra
note 20, at 398-402.
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provides that "[o]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes
with another's prospective contractual relation.., is subject to
liability... for the pecuniary harm resulting from . . .inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation."24
The key phrase here is "improperly interferes," for what section 766B proscribes is unjust or unprivileged interference. In
deciding the question of whether a boycott is improper, the goals
of the protester are balanced against the legitimate interests of the

target.2s Section 767 of the Restatement lists seven factors for use
in this balancing, including the interests of the parties and their

relationships, the actor's motives and conduct and the social interests involved.26 In practice, the courts have focused on the
conduct of the actor, his purposes, and the legitimacy of his in-

terest or "cause." Courts have found an unprivileged interference when they also found that violence or force was used
in the boycott,28 the boycott's purpose violated law or public
policy, 29 or the cause or interest was considered inadequate. 30

24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977).

2 Id. § 767 comment b.
26 Id. § 767.
27 See generally Comment, The Consumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L.J. 226, 234 (1971);
Comment, supra note 20, at 398-402.
28 E.g., A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 274 N.Y.S. at 949. The concept was applied to a labor boycott in Milk Wagon Drivers Local 752 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287 (1941), where the violence was held to be so pervasive as to make the whole
boycott illegal, but the Court, before Claiborne,had not addressed the question in relation to a non-labor boycott.
29 E.g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 198 P.2d 885, 889 (Cal. 1948), aff'd, 339 U.S.
460 (1950); Fair Share Org. v. Mitnick, 188 N.E.2d 840, 845-46 (Ind.App. 1963); In re
Young, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 624. Cf. 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 166 A.2d at 276-77 (the court
recognized the theory but upheld the boycott). The United States Supreme Court established
the "unlawful purpose" doctrine in the labor case of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
30 Green v. Samuelson, 178 A. at 109, and A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 274
N.Y.S. at 946, are two early cases which reflect a reluctance to recognize opposition to
racial discrimination as a valid goal. A contrary case from the same era is Anora Amusement Corp. v. Doe, 12 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1939), where the court recognized the
existence of a "'[p]urpose ... thought sufficient to justify the harm that may be done
to others."' Id. at 403 (quoting Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifldn, 157 N.E.
130, 132 (N.Y. 1927)). Since 1940, courts have generally not found boycott causes wanting, except in southern racial boycott cases such as Young Adults for Progressive Action,
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An act of violence committed during a boycott is always il-

legal. However, courts have split on whether such violence taints
the boycott to make the boycott itself unlawful. While the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. Grady" stated that "[a]ny
kind of boycott is unlawful if executed with force or violence or
threats,"32 other courts have sought to protect the non-violent
aspects of boycott activity, recognizing that a finding that violence,

for which there are other remedies, was involved should not be
a license to suppress valid peaceful expression."

In Hughes v. Superior Court," the United States Supreme
Court dealt with the second common ground for finding an unprivileged interference-illegal purpose of the boycott. The Court,
following the principle that even peaceful picketing could be

banned if used to induce an illegal act, which it had announced
shortly before in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.," upheld
a California ruling that a boycott with the avowed purpose of compelling a merchant to hire blacks in numbers proportional to black

patronage violated a state policy forbidding discrimination and
was therefore unlawful. 31 The Hughes decision has aroused considerable criticism, in part because it restricts speech on the basis
of content, 37 but the doctrine of the case-that an illegal goal

makes the boycott illegal-is firmly entrenched."
Inc. v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); NAACP
v. Overstreet, 142 S.E.2d at 816; Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. A.G. Corp.,
241 So. 2d at 619.
3' 411 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1969).
32 Id. at 187. A 1957 commentator stated that "even when only some of the means
are violent, the peaceful ones may be restrained as well." Comment, supra note 20, at
399. Accord A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 274 N.Y.S. at 946.
33 See, e.g., Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d at 283; Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d at 114.
34 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
W336 U.S. at 501-02.
36 The "policy was judicially declared and not statutory, but was upheld under the
theory that picketing was not entitled to full protection when it conflicted with a valid
state policy of ending discrimination." 339 U.S. at 465-69. For cases following a similar
position, see note 29 supra.
37 See T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 447; Etelson, supra note 22, at 27-29; Note,
The Invisible Hand, supra note 22, at 173-86. Justice Traynor's dissent in the California
case raised similar objections: "Only a clear danger to the community would justify judicial
rules that restrict the peaceful mobilization of a group's economic power to secure economic
equality." Hughes v. Superior Court, 198 P.2d at 896 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
38 The principle is cited in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3427
n.49. The "illegal purpose" in Hughes could have been pursued in a lawful way by not
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The third ground for finding a boycott illegal under tort law-

the boycotter's lack of a "just cause"-was used in the racial
discrimination cases of the 1930s. 39 During the 1962-70 era,
southern state courts in three cases 40 relied on a finding of unjust
cause to hold boycotts unlawful. All three decisions seem unsound,
with the courts showing a blindness to the discriminatory conditions protested against. 41 The Supreme Court, however, dismissed certiorari in one of the cases, NAACP v. Overstreet,42 and apparently was not asked to hear appeals in the other two cases.
Two of these "no just cause" cases also involved an important
new feature of boycott litigation. In earlier cases, injunctions

mentioning quotas and by simply continuing to boycott until an acceptable number of
blacks had been hired. This would clearly have been in accord with state policy. See 198
P.2d at 888.
39 See, e.g., Green v. Samuelson, 178 A. at 109; A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson,
274 N.Y.S. at 946.
40 Young Adults for Progressive Action, Inc. v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, 151 So.
2d at 877; NAACP v. Overstreet, 142 S.E.2d at 816; Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. A.G. Corp., 241 So. 2d at 619.
41 In Overstreet, the dispute arose from allegations that a white employer had struck
a young black worker, but the court believed the case did "not involve a controversy between the races." 142 S.E.2d at 831. In B & B Cash Grocery, the court saw the cause
of a hiring discrimination boycott as "mere non-employment of Negroes in certain
capacities." 151 So. 2d at 878. In A.G. Corp., the court viewed the disputes as a secondary boycott, a boycott of uninvolved third parties, and stressed the lack of prior notice
to the store owner of any complaint by the boycotters. 241 So. 2d at 624. Shortly after
the case was tried, Mississippi passed a secondary boycott statute (Miss. CODE ANN. §
97-23-85 (1972)) which broadened the potential for finding a boycott illegal. This statute
seeks to prohibit a conspiracy to induce others not to trade with a business when a) the
conspirators have a reasonable grievance over which the merchant has "no direct control
or no legal authority to correct," or b) when there is a grievance against the merchant
and no notice has been given the merchant or "no reasonable opportunity to correct such
alleged grievance." Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-83 (1972) makes it a crime to "threaten with
bodily harm, intimidate or coerce another person to prevent said person from lawfully
trading or carrying on business." Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-1-1(f) (1972) prohibits two persons from conspiring to commit any act injurious to trade or business.
Alabama has a similar statute aimed at conspiracy to interfere with business, but
the statute contains the qualifying phrase "without a just cause or legal excuse." ALA.
CODE § 13A-11-122 (1982). GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6-4 (1982) prohibits interference by
"force, intimidation, violence or threats thereof" with any employer in his business. While
federal courts had struck down two Alabama laws limiting picketing activity, Thornhil
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 88, and Kirkland v. Wallace, 403 F.2d at 413, the Supreme Court,
prior to Claiborne,had not considered these newer laws. For a discussion of the Mississippi
statutes, see Madison, supra note 16, at 583.
4 384 U.S. 118 (1966).
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against the boycott itself or against selected activities such as
picketing were sought. In Overstreet, however, the target of the
boycott sought damages and was awarded $35,793 compensatory
damages and $50,000 punitive damages." In Southern Christian
Leadership Conference v. A.G. Corp.,4 the original award was
for more than $114,000. 4s Finally, the recent Claibornecase involved a far larger award-more than $1.2 million. 4 Thus, these
three cases together represent an escalating trend of large damage
assessments with the obvious potential of "chilling" protest efforts. 47

B.

Sherman Act and State Antitrust Regulation

Action under state and federal antitrust statutes is a second
source of peril for boycotters. Whether the Sherman Act,"1 which
bans combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce, or similar state acts49 apply to these boycotts has been a
matter of considerable uncertainty and conjecture.0 However,
recent cases decided before Claibornestrongly suggest that the first
43 142 S.E.2d at 822, 827.
44 241 So. 2d at 619.
45 Id. at 629. This award was remanded for modification downward.

102 S. Ct. at 3415.
justice Douglas recognized this menace in his dissent from the dismissal of certiorari of Overstreet: "Juries hostile to the aims of an organization in the educational or
political field, unless carefully ;onfined by meticulous instructions and judicial supervision, can deliver crushing verdicts that may stifle organized dissent from the views and
policies accepted by the majority." 384 U.S. at 123 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas,
speaking for three other justices, drew an apt analogy with New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), where there had been a similar menace of a "chilling effect" on free
expression from large civil damage suits. 384 U.S. at 123 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Two subsidiary questions raised by these damage suits were the responsibility of
a "parent" organization like the NAACP for a locally-run boycott and the liability of the
organizers of a boycott for the acts of third parties who withheld patronage. See Note,
supra note 18, at 690. For a general discussion of the damage questions, see Sandifer &
Smith, supra note 13, at 575-77.
48 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
49 E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-1 (1972).
50 See Sandifer & Smith, supra note 13, at 573; Note, Legal Responsibility, supra
note 20, at 489; Note, PriorRestraintof RacialPicketing, 17 FLA. L. REV. 453, 457 (1964);
Note, supra 18, at 678-79 & nn.105-07.
Further, it would seem that almost any consumer boycott could have the effect
of restraining interstate commerce, presumably improper under modem commerce clause
46
47
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amendment severely restricts any application of the antitrust acts

to such activities. The Noerr-Penningtondoctrines' developed by
the Court in the 1960s clearly states that the right to petition for
legislative or administrative action is not subject to antitrust
controls.52 This doctrine was applied recently to protect a protest
3
boycott in Missouri v. National Organizationfor Women, Inc.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in that case held that the

Sherman Act and a state antitrust statute do not apply when a
non-commercial boycott involves the right of petition.54

IL
A.

THE CLAIBORNE HARDWARE CASE

The Mississippi Courts

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.5 originated with a
boycott of merchants in Port Gibson, Mississippi, launched by local

doctrine. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. Many cases have given a broad meaning to the
term "commerce" and the scope of the commerce clause. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51 The doctrine was announced in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and expanded in UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965).
52 The Court in Noerrheld that even anti-competitive intent did not subject action
to the antitrust laws when it represented an attempt to persuade the legislature to follow
a particular course. 365 U.S. at 136. In Pennington, the same principle was applied to
influence public administrative officials. 381 U.S. at 669-72.
620 F.2d at 1301.
620 F.2d at 1315-16. The Noerr doctrine has appeared in a number of recent cases
brought under the Sherman Act. Some involve, in effect, a reverse consumer boycott. For
example, in two cases involving shutdowns by gasoline dealers seeking to pressure the
Department of Energy to raise retail prices, the courts applied the Noerr-Penningtonconcepts, holding that the action was protected petition expression and was therefore not subject
to the antitrust laws. See Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Stations Dealers Ass'n,
499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F.
Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), reo'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980). A similar
refusal to apply the Sherman Act to political activity came in Council for Employment
& Economic Energy Use v. WHDH Corp., 580 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
945 (1978). A somewhat different situation arose in Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980), rev'd, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir.
1981), affd, 456 U.S. 212 (1982), where the district court applied Noerr to free from regulation a political boycott (refusal to unload Soviet wood) by a labor union. The court of
appeals and the Supreme Court, however, held that the political intent did not free the
union from the explicit statutory prohibitions against secondary boycotts.
5 102 S. Ct. at 3409.
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black leaders on April 1, 1966,0 after they had submitted a list
of twenty-one demands to the city and county leaders and had
failed to receive any satisfaction.' This protest continued into
1967 and was temporarily halted, then reinstated, after racial incidents in 1968 and 1969. Twenty-four merchants then filed suit
in 1969 to enjoin the boycott and recover damages from 146 individuals, the NAACP and the Mississippi Action for Progress
(MAP), a local Head Start organization.-,
After an eight month equity trial, the chancellor, in August
1976, held that 130 defendants (including the NAACP and MAP)
were liable in damages from the boycott. The court found that
the defendants had engaged in an illegal conspiracy, had committed the tort of malicious interference with a business, had conducted an illegal secondary boycottV9 and had violated Mississippi's restraint of trade statute.60'The court's finding that the
boycott had involved threats and intimidation and was laced with
61
violent acts was a crucial factor in its judgment of illegality.
The court issued an injunction against efforts to induce others to
boycott and awarded compensatory damages of $950,699 and attorney's fees of $300,000.62
56 Id. at 3418-19. The extraordinary delay which led to the case arriving at the

Supreme Court 16 years after the boycott started was in large part due to two related
actions in federal court. These were efforts to get the federal court to enjoin the state court
suit (Claiborne). In Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 50
F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Miss. 1970), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1019 (1972), the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a civil action, even if brought under two state statutes, was not "state
action" and refused to issue an injunction. 444 F.2d at 1310-12. In Henry v. First Nat'l
Bank, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980), the Fifth Circuit
indicated that there was a strong likelihood that the petitioners (the Claibornedefendants)
could win an appeal from the trial court decision in Claibornebecause of serious first amendment infringements, especially a broad injunction issued against the boycott, and upheld
the district court's injunction against any enforcement of the judgment, pending review
by the Mississippi Supreme Court, and, if necessary, the United States Supreme Court.
595 F.2d at 294, 303.
57 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1295-97 (Miss. 1981), rev'd,
102 S. Ct. at 3409. All were either wholly or partly political demands except for number
four-"all stores must employ Negro clerks and cashiers." 393 So. 2d at 1295-96.
8 Id. at 1292. For a more detailed account of the boycott, see 102 S. Ct. at 3418-21.
59 For details of the Mississippi lower and appellate court trials, see 102 S. Ct. at
3413-17 and 393 So. 2d at 1290. Three findings of the trial court involved violations of
Mississippi statutes: Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-1-1(f), 97-23-85 (1972).
60 MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-1 (1972).
61 393 So. 2d at 1298-1300, 1302; 102 S. Ct. at 3416.
62 393 So. 2d at 1293.
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In the appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court,63 the
NAACP especially questioned the applicability of the relevant

statutes and stressed first amendment questions. 64 The state
supreme court upheld the lower court's finding of tort liability,
holding that a boycott executed with force or violence or threats,65
all of which it found present, is illegal regardless of its purpose.

As to the statutory grounds, the court found a violation of Mississippi conspiracy and intimidation statutes,66 but did reverse on
several grounds, holding that the restraint of trade statute did not
apply6 and that the secondary boycott statute6 could not be enforced in this case because it was not enacted until after the boycott
began. The court also dismissed the claims against MAP and
thirty-seven individual defendants, but affirmed the liability of
the national NAACP organization. 70 In its major concession to
the appellants' claims, the court did find several errors in the
calculation of damages and accordingly remanded for a
71
modification.

63 Because of a parallel action in federal court, the appeal of the case was delayed
and the Mississippi Supreme Court did not decide the case until December 1980. See 102
S. Ct. at 3414 n.5, 3416. See note 56 supra for an account of the federal litigation.
64 393 So. 2d at 1293-94.
65 Id. at 1301.
66 Id. at 1301-02. The court also suggested a lack of "just cause" based on the theory
that since blacks made up three-fourths of the population of Claiborne County they could
have achieved their goals at the ballot box. Id. at 1295.
67 Id. at 1301. The court noted that the statute, MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-1 (1972),
was patterned after the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and interpreted
the Mississippi Act similarly in that political boycotts were not violative. 393 So. 2d at 1301.
68 MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-85 (1972). See note 41 supra discussing this statute and
the nature of secondary boycotts.
69 393 So. 2d at 1300-01. The court thereby avoided any judgment on the constitutionality of the statute, a question raised by the NAACP. This question was involved in
other litigation growing out of a Vicksburg, Mississippi boycott. In Concerned Citizens
v. Sills, 567 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1978), the circuit court of appeals refused, under the Younger
doctrine of abstention, to give a declaratory judgment on the legality of § 97-23-85 and
§ 97-23-83, or to enjoin their enforcement in a state court proceeding. Since prosecutions
of the six people indicted under the statute were terminated by the filing of a nolle prosequi, 567 F.2d at 649, the constitutionality of the two statutes has apparently not yet been
ruled on by any court.
70 393 So. 2d at 1302-03.
71 The errors included improper allowance of pre-judgment interest and incorrect
calculation of lost profits and loss of goodwill. Id. at 1303-07. The court did not consider
the validity of the lower court's injunction; the NAACP stipulated that the point was moot.
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The United States Supreme Court Decision

The United States Supreme Court noted in Claibornethat the
Mississippi Supreme Court had rejected the two statutory theories
of liability which could have applied to a non-violent, non-coercive
boycott and instead had based its decision on the tort claim.72
This holding of tort liability rested on the concept that violence
made the whole boycott illegal. 73
The Court rejected the Mississippi courts' reliance on the incidental presence of violence in the boycott, setting forth a strong
defense of the legality of peaceful boycotts, especially those with
a political purpose, and stressing that the speech, assembly, petitioning and peaceful picketing involved were clearly protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments. 74 The Court recognized
that regulation which only incidentally affects first amendment
rights might be justified, but emphasized that "[w]hile states may
have broad powers to regulate economic activity, we do not find
a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as
that found in the boycott in this case." 75 Noting that it had
previously ruled in Noerr76 that the individual's right to petition
can override the government's right to regulate economic activity,
the Court held that the nonviolent activities associated with the
boycott were entitled to first amendment protection.77
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 78 acknowledged
that the violence present in the boycott could be made a basis of
liability, 79 but noted that there were strict limits to this liability,
and that a state "may not award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity. Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered."0 Since
72 102 S. Ct. at 3416-17.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 3423-25.
75 Id. at 3426.
76 365 U.S. at 127, cited in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
77 102 S. Ct. at 3426.

78 The opinion was joined by six other justices, with Justice Rehnquist concurring
in the result. 102 S. Ct. at 3437 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Marshall took no part
in the decision.
71 Id. at 3427-28. Justice Stevens further observed that "violent conduct is beyond
the pale of constitutional protection." Id. at 3436.
80 Id. at 3429.
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the acts of violence were limited in number, the Court concluded
that state power had been used to impose liability for nonviolent
activities."'
Significantly, the Court did recognize that violence might be
so pervasive as to enable a court to characterize the whole boycott
effort as a "violent conspiracy" and therefore to inflict broader
damages. 2 But Justice Stevens noted:
Such a characterization must be supported by findings that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding that specific
parties agreed to use unlawful means, that carefully identify the
impact of such unlawful conduct, and that recognize the importance of avoiding the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected activity. The burden of demonstrating that fear
rather than protected conduct was the dominant force in the
movement is heavy.83
Thus, while the Court acknowledged that a boycott could possibly
be characterized as a violent conspiracy, it appears that the standard articulated by Justice Stevens severely limits the ability of
a court of impose tort liability on an entire boycott effort. The
plaintiff would need to prove a specific conspiracy to use violence
and show that such violence was the cause of all of the losses suffered by the boycott targets for which damages were sought. Further, it must be shown that protected activity is not punished by
the imposition of liability.
Finally, the Court dealt with certain questions about the scope
of liability, holding that "civil liability may not be imposed merely
because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which
committed acts of violence,"' 4 that mere attendance at NAACP
meetings did not create liability,," and that to find the NAACP

81 Id. at 3431. The Court distinguished the more limited violence present in

Claibornefrom the situation in Milk Wagon Drivers Local 752 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. at 287. In Meadowmoor, the Court upheld an injunction against both violent
and non-violent activity because the violence was "pervasive." Id. at 293. In Claiborne,
the Court dissolved the trial court's injunction because the violence was incidental to a
generally peaceful political boycott. 102 S. Ct. at 3431-32.
82 102 S. Ct. at 3437.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 3430.

8 Id. at 3432.
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liable without proof that it ratified or authorized unlawful conduct would impermissibly burden the right of political
assembly. 86
III.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

BOYCOTT

LIABILITY

AFTER CLAIBORNE

Claiborne involved a political boycott, its purpose being
political change. The following discussion examines the effects of
Claiborneon both political and economic boycotts, the latter being boycotts seeking to change economic conditions. Although some
protests against racial discrimination might properly be classed
as economic boycotts, the Court seems likely to give these protests a highly protected status, having virtually equated them with
political boycotts.87
A.

Tort Liability
1.

"Just Cause" Element Eliminated

Peaceful political boycotts seem highly protected after Claiborne. The Court said in that case that lawful, peaceful activities
may not be the basis of a damage award.88 By indicating that the
activities themselves are constitutionally protected,89 the Court
has rendered the "just cause" element of tort liability virtually
meaningless, at least when the alleged tortfeasors were engaged
in political crusades, whether against "real or fancied grievances."
While the justifiability of a protest cause would not be a factor

86 Holding that the mere advocacy of force does not remove speech from the protection of the first amendment, the Court could find no constitutional basis for the liability imposed on Charles Evers, field secretary of the NAACP in Mississippi. As the NAACP
liability rested on the connection of the organization to Evers, the Court held that the
proof would not support liability for the organization. Id. at 3433-36. Portions of a speech
by Evers to boycotters on April 19, 1969, are printed as an appendix, id. at 3437-40.
87 See id. at 3426-27. See also Note, supra note 18, at 611 n.18.
88 Id. at 3429. In Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1301, Judge Stephenson emphasized
that "the right of petition is of such importance that it is not an improper interference
[under state tort law] even when exercised by way of a boycott." Id. at 1307, (quoted
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3426-27 n.48.).
89 102 S. Ct. at 3436.
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in determining the legality of a political boycott, the reasonableness

of the means of protest used could still be considered.1°
Since the activities (speech, assembly, picketing and petition-

ing) used in conducting an economic boycott are the same as those
used for political protests, economic boycotts should receive similar

protection against efforts to impose tort liability for interference
with prospective advantage. The validity of the boycotter's

economic protest should not be assessed in terms of "just cause."
This does not mean total freedom from responsibility for the
truthfulness of charges made by boycotters; untruthful assertions

would be open to a claim of trade-libel under the traditional exception to first amendment protections. Although the trade-libel
avenue of possible recovery should not apply to political boycotts,
it should be reasonable to apply it to economic boycotts. Damages,
however, should only be granted for malicious falsehood. 91
2.

Continued Viability of the "Unlawful Purpose" Doctrine

The unlawful purpose doctrine articulated in Hughes v.
Superior Court92 and reaffirmed by the Court in Claiborne9a
90 If, for example, a boycott of downtown stores was conducted for the purpose of
pressuring city government to reduce parking fees, it would be irrelevant whether downtown
parking fees were or were not unreasonably high. Such a boycott conducted against only
one store, whose owner was not in a position to affect city policy (assuming no further
anti-competitive purpose for the boycott), would be hard to justify as a reasonable protest worthy of protection. A concern for the unfairness of singling out one merchant would
seem to call for some regulation would not be content-based and would be in step with
the O'Brientest-which defines the conditions necessary for allowable government regulation of expression-set forth in Claiborne,102 S. Ct. at 3425 n.47. The point is that, even
with the liberal view of Claiborne,gross abuses of the right of political protest could and
should be regulated.
91 See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at § 112; Comment, supra note 20, at 470 n.91.
The situation in a publicly conducted boycott would be analogous to speech about public
figures. There is a need to protect the public's right to hear differing views, but there also
is a concern for the rights of the object of the public comment. For this reason, a standard
similar to the "knowing or reckless falsity" standard established in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254, would be a fair one and would balance the two interests. In
Direct Import Buyer's Ass'n v. K.S.L., Inc., 572 P.2d 692 (Utah 1977), the court held
that where a product of a business is involved, the correct standard is actual malice. Id.
at 696. Statements about the operation of a business could logically be given the same
protection as statements about a product.
92 339 U.S. at 460. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text for a critical discussion of Hughes.
93 The Court noted that they were not "presented with a boycott designed to secure
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would be a possible ground for restricting both political and economic boycotts, although such restraints on a political boycott
would raise questions of content-based regulation.94 Under the
Hughes facts, the most common "economic" boycott-that directed
against discriminatory hiring-faces a potential threat, but this
can be overcome by avoiding any mention of quotas or hiring
ratios. Although logically inconsistent, it seems likely that a boycott
promoting more hiring of white persons would be seen as falling
within the "unlawful purpose" doctrine.
3.

Violent Acts in Boycotts

Claiborne does not depart from the traditional view that
violent boycott activities are unlawful and unprotected. 95 The
case's major contribution is that the Court sought to assure that
such violence will not be used to regulate or suppress peaceful,
protected activities. The standard used by the Court prohibits
general liability based on the mere existence of violence incidental to a boycott.9 This Claiborne test also makes it difficult to
97
establish that a boycott was violent as a whole.
Individuals responsible for violence are still liable for the results
of their acts after the Claiborne decisions, but this would be a
minimal deterrent to a protest movement, compared to the "chilling effect" of the damages awards originally granted in Overstreet,
A.G. Corp. or Claiborne.98
B.

Statutory Liability
1. Antitrust Statutes

The Court's treatment of political and economic boycotts might
differ significantly in the area of their susceptibility to antitrust
aims that are themselves prohibited by a valid state law." 102 S. Ct. at 3427 n.49.
94 See note 37 supra and accompanying text for this criticism of Hughes.
95 See id. at 3427-29.
96 See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this test.
97 See 102 S. Ct. at 3437. However, the Court's reference in Part IV to a "massive
and prolonged effort to change... a local environment," id.,
could be read to mean that
the principle being set forth would not be applied to a smaller, localized boycott effort.
98 See text accompanying notes 42-45, 62 supra for a discussion of these damage
awards.
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regulation. The Court in Claibornereiterated the exemption from
such regulation that political action derives under the NoerrPennington doctrine.99 But economic boycotts might be subject
to regulation in this area if the acts have an anti-competitive nature
and do not involve the right to petition for legislative or administrative action by the government. A boycott without a valid
right of petition would likely be for some anti-competitive purpose and therefore be subject to restriction under the antitrust
statutes.
Furthermore, although regulation of an economic boycott
could be possible, a non-commercial and non-competitive
economic boycott should not be included in such regulation. It
is possible, for example, that a hiring discrimination boycott would
have the incidental effect of diverting business to black-owned businesses or to those employing more black persons. Regulation
because of these economic effects, however, would be unjustified,
as the intent of such a boycott is not to affect competition but to
change hiring practices.
2.

Secondary Boycott Statutes

The Claiborne opinion did not discuss the extent to which
secondary boycotts may be properly regulated, 10 0 but it is difficult to see how any regulation of political boycotts as secondary
boycotts could be permitted. Most political boycotts inherently
have secondary effects, and the regulation of such effects would
impermissibly burden protected political expression. The Mississippi secondary boycott statute,10' for example, is overbroad in that

9 102 S. Ct. at 3426. For a discussion of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, see notes
52-52 supra.
100 The Court stated:
We need not decide in this case the extent to which a narrowly tailored

statute designed to prohibit certain forms of anticompetitive conduct or certain types of secondary pressure may restrict protected First Amendment ac-

tivity. No such statute is involved in this case. Nor are we presented with
a boycott designed to secure aims that are themselves prohibited by a valid

state law.
Id. at 3427 n.49.
101 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-85 (1972). See note 41 supra for a summary of the pro-

visions of this act. Such an act applied to the Evanston boycott mentioned in note 11 supra

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

its effect would be to ban almost every political boycott carried
out by economic means.
An economic boycott, in contrast to a political boycott, could
be reasonably regulated by a narrowly tailored secondary boycott
statute, assuming that the "secondary" boycott is not in actuality
a boycott narrowly directly against a particular product as in
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local
769,102 where the Court upheld the validity of such a boycott.
On,the other hand, the Court's recent decision in International
Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International,Inc.103 shows
a willingness to accept statutory regulation of economic pressure
exerted in a labor boycott on uninvolved third parties, although
that decision may be limited to labor boycotts.
C.

Injunctive Relief and Damages

The state supreme court in Claiborne considered the trial
court's injunction as moot and did not deal with it, but the United
States Supreme Court dissolved the injunction, making it clear
that lawful activity must not be restrained in this fashion.104
Because economic boycott activity, especially picketing, can be
just as lawful as that used to support political protest, this protection should extend to the lawful, peaceful portions of both types
of boycotts.105

would ban what is clearly a protected effort to effect political change. The boycott is a
secondary one, as the targets are not directly in a position to control city legislation.
102 377 U.S. 58 (1964). The Court there held that the careful picketing of a product
could be considered a primary boycott against the product rather than a secondary boycott
illegal under 19 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1983). The picketers did not urge shoppers
to withhold patronage from the stores, but simply urged them not to buy the product itself.
This approach was applied by the courts in the grape and lettuce boycott cases. See Jones
v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 308 N.E.2d 512 (Mass. 1974); C. Comella Inc. v. United
Farm Workers Org. Comm., 292 N.E.2d 647 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972).
103 456 U.S. at 212. See note 54 supra for a discussion of this case. It is possible that
the Court sees obedience to the secondary boycott provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
as a trade-off for the general labor exemption from regulation of picketing. A non-labor
boycott, which has no exemption, might not be held to the same standard.
104 See 102 S. Ct. at 3432 n.67.
105 See id. at 3423-24. Economic boycotts are probably more open to state regulation than political protests, see id. at 3427, but other non-boycott decisions suggest that
there would be minimal danger of such regulation of the peaceful picketing activity itself.
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Whether the boycott be economic or political, Claiborne
bolsters the protection from ruinous damages enjoyed by groups
like the NAACP. It makes clear that mere membership in a group
or association with persons committing violence will not bring
liability to the individual or the group. Only if it is proved that
the organization promoted or approved violence can liability be
placed on the organization. 10 6
CONCLUSION

The Court in Claibornehas clarified the broad protection that
peaceful boycotts enjoy. By stressing the protected nature of the
activities, the Court has virtually eliminated some of the means
which had been commonly used to hold such boycotts illegal, such
as findings of "no just cause" or injunctions based on secondary
boycott or antitrust statutes. The only significant limitation on
boycotts remaining after Claiborneis the "unlawful purpose" doctrine of Hughes. Although economic protests are less protected,
they also are largely safe from state efforts to limit peaceful boycotts
by statute or tort actions.
Claiborne'sgreatest contribution, however, is in thwarting the
threat of large damages based on incidental violence, a threat that
could have stifled both political and economic protests in which
tensions often produce some scattered violence. The protection offered by the Claiborne standard for assessing damages from .
violence is especially broad for those organizations whose sponsorship may be the impetus needed for a successful boycott.
Recognizing that "one of the foundations of our society is the
right of individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of
a common goal by lawful means,"' Claiborneis directed at protecting peaceful protest activity. The new standard set forth should
avoid the unjustifiable judicial act of visiting all with the sins of
a few. Justice Stevens states this goal in his conclusion: "A court

See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 98-99 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 574 (1965).
106 See 102 S. Ct. at 3432-36. This is especially significant since such an organization, especially if it is part of a national group, will likely have the only "deep pockets"
among possible defendants.
107 102 S. Ct. at 3436.
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must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is better
revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of
countless free-standing trees.' ' 0 8
Carl B. Boyd, Jr.

108 Id. at 3437.

